Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mathematical Methods in Philosophy', 'Experience First (and reply)' and 'Dispositional Essentialism Grounds Laws of Nature?'

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17 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
18739 Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18741 Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
18744 Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
18740 If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
14348 An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry]
14347 A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
14350 If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
18745 A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18747 The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
18748 Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
18746 Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18750 Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19542 It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
19543 To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
19541 Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
14351 Maybe an experiment unmasks an essential disposition, and reveals its regularities [Corry]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
14346 Dispositional essentialism says fundamental laws of nature are strict, not ceteris paribus [Corry]