33 ideas
| 18739 | Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18741 | Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18744 | Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18740 | If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 23664 | Powers are quite distinct and simple, and so cannot be defined [Reid] |
| 23669 | Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon [Reid] |
| 23666 | It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid] |
| 18745 | A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18747 | The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18748 | Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18746 | Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18750 | Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 6685 | 'Subjectivism' is an extension of relativism from the social group to the individual [Graham] |
| 23665 | Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers [Reid] |
| 23668 | Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will [Reid] |
| 20051 | Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation [Reid, by Stout,R] |
| 6699 | The chain of consequences may not be the same as the chain of responsibility [Graham] |
| 6698 | Negative consequences are very hard (and possibly impossible) to assess [Graham] |
| 6700 | We can't criticise people because of unforeseeable consequences [Graham] |
| 6704 | Egoism submits to desires, but cannot help form them [Graham] |
| 6701 | Rescue operations need spontaneous benevolence, not careful thought [Graham] |
| 6693 | 'What if everybody did that?' rather misses the point as an objection to cheating [Graham] |
| 6691 | It is more plausible to say people can choose between values, than that they can create them [Graham] |
| 6688 | Life is only absurd if you expected an explanation and none turns up [Graham] |
| 6705 | Existentialism may transcend our nature, unlike eudaimonism [Graham] |
| 6690 | A standard problem for existentialism is the 'sincere Nazi' [Graham] |
| 6689 | The key to existentialism: the way you make choices is more important than what you choose [Graham] |
| 8383 | Day and night are constantly conjoined, but they don't cause one another [Reid, by Crane] |
| 23667 | Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid] |
| 23670 | Scientists don't know the cause of magnetism, and only discover its regulations [Reid] |
| 23671 | Laws are rules for effects, but these need a cause; rules of navigation don't navigate [Reid] |
| 6706 | The great religions are much more concerned with the religious life than with ethics [Graham] |
| 6709 | Western religion saves us from death; Eastern religion saves us from immortality [Graham] |