Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mathematical Methods in Philosophy', 'Aenesidemus' and 'The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

28 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
18739 Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18741 Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
18744 Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
18740 If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
6472 Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
22014 Consciousness is not entirely representational, because there are pains, and the self [Schulze, by Pinkard]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
6473 Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
6465 We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell]
6471 The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
18745 A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18747 The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
18748 Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
18746 Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18750 Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
6466 Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
6483 Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H]
8244 Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]
6462 Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell]
6463 Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell]
6464 Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell]
6467 No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / c. Unperceived sense-data
6459 We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell]
6460 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell]
6461 Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
6458 Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell]
6469 Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
6470 Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
6468 There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell]