49 ideas
2352 | The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam] |
4643 | The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations [Baggini /Fosl] |
4633 | You cannot rationally deny the principle of non-contradiction, because all reasoning requires it [Baggini /Fosl] |
4635 | Dialectic aims at unified truth, unlike analysis, which divides into parts [Baggini /Fosl] |
2345 | Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam] |
2347 | Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam] |
4632 | 'Natural' systems of deduction are based on normal rational practice, rather than on axioms [Baggini /Fosl] |
4631 | In ideal circumstances, an axiom should be such that no rational agent could possibly object to its use [Baggini /Fosl] |
18739 | Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
4638 | The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin' [Baggini /Fosl] |
18741 | Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18744 | Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18740 | If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
2349 | Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam] |
2351 | Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved [Putnam] |
4640 | If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [Baggini /Fosl, by PG] |
4647 | 'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good [Baggini /Fosl] |
4639 | Leibniz's Law is about the properties of objects; the Identity of Indiscernibles is about perception of objects [Baggini /Fosl] |
4646 | Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori? [Baggini /Fosl] |
18745 | A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18747 | The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18748 | Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18746 | Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18750 | Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
4645 | 'A priori' does not concern how you learn a proposition, but how you show whether it is true or false [Baggini /Fosl] |
4582 | Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed [Baggini /Fosl] |
4644 | A proposition such as 'some swans are purple' cannot be falsified, only verified [Baggini /Fosl] |
4584 | The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature [Baggini /Fosl] |
4583 | How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction? [Baggini /Fosl] |
4634 | Abduction aims at simplicity, testability, coherence and comprehensiveness [Baggini /Fosl] |
4637 | To see if an explanation is the best, it is necessary to investigate the alternative explanations [Baggini /Fosl] |
2331 | Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam] |
2071 | If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam] |
2332 | Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam] |
2348 | Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam] |
2344 | If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam] |
2074 | Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology? [Putnam] |
4629 | Consistency is the cornerstone of rationality [Baggini /Fosl] |
2343 | Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam] |
2346 | Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam] |
2354 | "Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam] |
2336 | Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam] |
2334 | Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam] |
2335 | Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam] |
2340 | We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam] |
2341 | Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam] |
2339 | Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't [Putnam] |
2338 | Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts [Putnam] |
2342 | "Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam] |