Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mathematical Methods in Philosophy', 'Review of 'Aenesidemus'' and 'The Case against Closure (and reply)'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


18 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Mental presentation are not empirical, but concern the strivings of the self [Fichte]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
The thing-in-itself is an empty dream [Fichte, by Pinkard]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske]
We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske]
Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske]
Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske]
The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske]
P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske]
We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske]