16 ideas
9944 | We understand some statements about all sets [Putnam] |
18739 | Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18741 | Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18744 | Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
9937 | I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations' [Putnam] |
9939 | It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed [Putnam] |
9940 | Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it [Putnam] |
9941 | Science requires more than consistency of mathematics [Putnam] |
18740 | If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
9943 | You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam] |
12812 | Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive [Locke] |
18745 | A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18747 | The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18748 | Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18746 | Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18750 | Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew] |