14 ideas
18739 | Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18741 | Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18744 | Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18740 | If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
18745 | A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18747 | The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18748 | Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18746 | Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18750 | Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
8070 | It would be better to point to failings of character, than to moral wrongness of actions [Anscombe] |
8065 | 'Ought' and 'right' are survivals from earlier ethics, and should be jettisoned [Anscombe] |
8069 | Between Aristotle and us, a Judaeo-Christian legal conception of ethics was developed [Anscombe] |
10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |