42 ideas
18739 | Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18741 | Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18744 | Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18740 | If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
16185 | Causality indicates which properties are real [Cartwright,N] |
1350 | Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid] |
21322 | We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid] |
21320 | Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid] |
1367 | Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid] |
18745 | A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18747 | The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18748 | Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18746 | Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18750 | Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
23644 | Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid] |
23643 | We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid] |
16182 | Two main types of explanation are by causes, or by citing a theoretical framework [Cartwright,N] |
16184 | An explanation is a model that fits a theory and predicts the phenomenological laws [Cartwright,N] |
16167 | Laws get the facts wrong, and explanation rests on improvements and qualifications of laws [Cartwright,N] |
16169 | Laws apply to separate domains, but real explanations apply to intersecting domains [Cartwright,N] |
16176 | Covering-law explanation lets us explain storms by falling barometers [Cartwright,N] |
16177 | I disagree with the covering-law view that there is a law to cover every single case [Cartwright,N] |
16180 | You can't explain one quail's behaviour by just saying that all quails do it [Cartwright,N] |
16171 | The covering law view assumes that each phenomenon has a 'right' explanation [Cartwright,N] |
16183 | In science, best explanations have regularly turned out to be false [Cartwright,N] |
1356 | A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid] |
1359 | Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid] |
21319 | I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid] |
21323 | The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid] |
21321 | Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid] |
21324 | If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid] |
21325 | Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid] |
21327 | If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid] |
1366 | If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid] |
1352 | Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid] |
16175 | A cause won't increase the effect frequency if other causes keep interfering [Cartwright,N] |
6781 | There are fundamental explanatory laws (false!), and phenomenological laws (regularities) [Cartwright,N, by Bird] |
16166 | Laws of appearances are 'phenomenological'; laws of reality are 'theoretical' [Cartwright,N] |
16179 | Good organisation may not be true, and the truth may not organise very much [Cartwright,N] |
16170 | To get from facts to equations, we need a prepared descriptions suited to mathematics [Cartwright,N] |
16181 | Simple laws have quite different outcomes when they act in combinations [Cartwright,N] |
16178 | There are few laws for when one theory meets another [Cartwright,N] |