19 ideas
9217 | Modern empirical metaphysics focuses on ontological commitments of discourse, or on presuppositions [Loux/Zimmerman] |
18739 | Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18741 | Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18744 | Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18740 | If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18745 | A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18747 | The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18748 | Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18746 | Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18750 | Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
23438 | Full rationality must include morality [Foot] |
23437 | Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot] |
23436 | It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot] |
23431 | Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot] |
23432 | Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot] |
23433 | Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot] |
23434 | There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot] |
23439 | Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot] |
23435 | If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot] |