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All the ideas for 'Mathematical Methods in Philosophy', 'works' and 'Epistemic Norms'

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28 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Descartes showed a one-one order-preserving match between points on a line and the real numbers [Descartes, by Hart,WD]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Descartes, by Tuck]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock]
Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
We have inner awareness of our freedom [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Descartes discussed the interaction problem, and compared it with gravity [Descartes, by Lycan]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature is devoid of thought [Descartes, by Meillassoux]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Matter can't just be Descartes's geometry, because a filler of the spaces is needed [Robinson,H on Descartes]