Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mathematical Methods in Philosophy', 'Reply to Sixth Objections' and 'Truthmaking for Presentists'

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21 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18928 If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18931 Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18932 The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
18923 The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron]
18926 One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron]
18929 We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
18739 Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18741 Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
18744 Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
18740 If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
3644 Two things being joined together doesn't prove they are the same [Descartes]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
18924 Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
18930 Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
18745 A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18747 The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
18748 Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
18746 Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18750 Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
3621 Only judgement decides which of our senses are reliable [Descartes]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
18927 Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
3637 Ideas in God's mind only have value if he makes it so [Descartes]