22 ideas
18739 | Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
18741 | Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18744 | Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18740 | If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
13804 | A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G] |
13805 | Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature [Forbes,G] |
12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
13808 | A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist [Forbes,G] |
12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
13806 | Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G] |
13807 | A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G] |
13809 | One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G] |
12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
13810 | The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G] |
18745 | A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18747 | The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18748 | Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18746 | Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18750 | Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |