16 ideas
| 18739 | Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18741 | Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18744 | Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18740 | If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18745 | A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18747 | The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18748 | Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18746 | Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18750 | Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 20062 | If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong [Chisholm] |
| 20054 | There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent [Chisholm] |
| 18225 | If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard] |
| 18228 | An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard] |
| 18224 | Goodness is given either by a psychological state, or the attribution of a property [Korsgaard] |
| 18233 | Contemplation is final because it is an activity which is not a process [Korsgaard] |
| 18226 | For Aristotle, contemplation consists purely of understanding [Korsgaard] |