19 ideas
3269 | If your life is to be meaningful as part of some large thing, the large thing must be meaningful [Nagel] |
14187 | If logic is topic-neutral that means it delves into all subjects, rather than having a pure subject matter [Read] |
18739 | Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
14188 | Not all arguments are valid because of form; validity is just true premises and false conclusion being impossible [Read] |
14182 | If the logic of 'taller of' rests just on meaning, then logic may be the study of merely formal consequence [Read] |
14183 | Maybe arguments are only valid when suppressed premises are all stated - but why? [Read] |
14184 | In modus ponens the 'if-then' premise contributes nothing if the conclusion follows anyway [Read] |
18741 | Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
14186 | Logical connectives contain no information, but just record combination relations between facts [Read] |
18744 | Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18740 | If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
14185 | Conditionals are just a shorthand for some proof, leaving out the details [Read] |
18745 | A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18747 | The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18748 | Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18746 | Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18750 | Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
3270 | Justifications come to an end when we want them to [Nagel] |
3268 | If a small brief life is absurd, then so is a long and large one [Nagel] |