17 ideas
3269 | If your life is to be meaningful as part of some large thing, the large thing must be meaningful [Nagel] |
18739 | Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
12219 | Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
18741 | Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
10922 | Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine] |
18744 | Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18740 | If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
10923 | Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine] |
10921 | Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine] |
10924 | Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine] |
18745 | A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18747 | The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18748 | Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18746 | Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18750 | Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
3270 | Justifications come to an end when we want them to [Nagel] |
3268 | If a small brief life is absurd, then so is a long and large one [Nagel] |