Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mathematical Methods in Philosophy', 'Events and Reification' and 'Mental Events'

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23 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
18739 Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18741 Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
18744 Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
18740 If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
18745 A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18747 The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
18748 Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
18746 Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18750 Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
4983 There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
3529 Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
2307 Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim]
5497 Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan]
4081 Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane]
2321 If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim]
3404 Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
3405 If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
16041 Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
6620 Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
3429 Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
10370 Causal relata are individuated by coarse spacetime regions [Quine, by Schaffer,J]
3524 Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin]
3526 Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin]