41 ideas
| 21855 | Only in the 1780s did it become acceptable to read Spinoza [Lord] |
| 12780 | We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz] |
| 12774 | Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz] |
| 12782 | Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz] |
| 12777 | Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz] |
| 6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
| 6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
| 12778 | There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz] |
| 12783 | Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz] |
| 12775 | Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz] |
| 12776 | Every substance is alive [Leibniz] |
| 12753 | A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz] |
| 12781 | A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz] |
| 12779 | There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz] |
| 6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
| 6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
| 6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
| 6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
| 6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
| 6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
| 6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
| 6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
| 6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
| 6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
| 6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
| 6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
| 6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
| 6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
| 6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
| 6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
| 6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
| 12785 | Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz] |
| 6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
| 6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
| 6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
| 21866 | Hobbes and Spinoza use 'conatus' to denote all endeavour for advantage in nature [Lord] |
| 6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
| 6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
| 12784 | Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz] |