41 ideas
| 6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
| 6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
| 14963 | Surely the past phases of a thing are not parts of the thing? [Broad] |
| 6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
| 6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
| 6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
| 6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
| 6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
| 6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
| 6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
| 6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
| 6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
| 6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
| 6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
| 6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
| 6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
| 6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
| 6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
| 6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
| 6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
| 6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
| 6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
| 6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
| 6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
| 6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
| 21202 | The strong force has a considerably greater range than the weak force [Martin,BR] |
| 21211 | If an expected reaction does not occur, that implies a conservation law [Martin,BR] |
| 21209 | Electron emit and reabsorb photons, which create and reabsorb virtual electrons and positrons [Martin,BR] |
| 21212 | The Higgs field, unlike others, has a nozero value in a state without particles [Martin,BR] |
| 21201 | A 'field' is just a region to which points can be assigned in space and time [Martin,BR] |
| 21205 | Many physicists believe particles have further structure, if only we could see it [Martin,BR] |
| 21203 | Uncertainty allows very brief violations of energy conservation - even shorter with higher energies [Martin,BR] |
| 21207 | The Exclusion Principle says no two fermions occupy the same state, with the same numbers [Martin,BR] |
| 21204 | The standard model combines theories of strong interaction, and electromagnetic and weak interaction [Martin,BR] |
| 21208 | Eletrons don't literally 'spin', because they are point-like [Martin,BR] |
| 21210 | Virtual particles surround any charged particle [Martin,BR] |
| 21206 | The properties of a particle are determined by its quantum numbers and its mass [Martin,BR] |
| 21213 | String theory only has one free parameter (tension) - unlike the standard model with 19 [Martin,BR] |
| 21200 | An 'element' is what cannot be decomposed by chemistry [Martin,BR] |