40 ideas
5893 | A wise man has integrity, firmness of will, nobility, consistency, sobriety, patience [Cicero] |
5891 | Philosophy is the collection of rational arguments [Cicero] |
19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
5879 | The soul is the heart, or blood in the heart, or part of the brain, of something living in heart or brain, or breath [Cicero] |
5884 | How can one mind perceive so many dissimilar sensations? [Cicero] |
5887 | The soul has a single nature, so it cannot be divided, and hence it cannot perish [Cicero] |
6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
5886 | Like the eye, the soul has no power to see itself, but sees other things [Cicero] |
6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
5885 | Souls contain no properties of elements, and elements contain no properties of souls [Cicero] |
6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |
5890 | We should not share the distress of others, but simply try to relieve it [Cicero] |
5894 | All men except philosophers fear poverty [Cicero] |
5895 | If one despises illiterate mechanics individually, they are not worth more collectively [Cicero] |
6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |