61 ideas
14888 | Wisdom prevents us from being ruled by the moment [Nietzsche] |
14863 | Unlike science, true wisdom involves good taste [Nietzsche] |
14890 | Suffering is the meaning of existence [Nietzsche] |
14861 | Philosophy ennobles the world, by producing an artistic conception of our knowledge [Nietzsche] |
14887 | You should only develop a philosophy if you are willing to live by it [Nietzsche] |
14885 | The first aim of a philosopher is a life, not some works [Nietzsche] |
14889 | Philosophy is pointless if it does not advocate, and live, a new way of life [Nietzsche] |
14862 | Philosophy is more valuable than much of science, because of its beauty [Nietzsche] |
14878 | It would better if there was no thought [Nietzsche] |
14881 | Why do people want philosophers? [Nietzsche] |
14876 | Philosophy is always secondary, because it cannot support a popular culture [Nietzsche] |
14860 | Kant has undermined our belief in metaphysics [Nietzsche] |
14859 | If philosophy controls science, then it has to determine its scope, and its value [Nietzsche] |
14880 | Logic is just slavery to language [Nietzsche] |
14869 | If some sort of experience is at the root of matter, then human knowledge is close to its essence [Nietzsche] |
6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
10993 | Ramsey's Test: believe the consequent if you believe the antecedent [Ramsey, by Read] |
14279 | Asking 'If p, will q?' when p is uncertain, then first add p hypothetically to your knowledge [Ramsey] |
14875 | Belief matters more than knowledge, and only begins when knowledge ceases [Nietzsche] |
6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
14866 | It always remains possible that the world just is the way it appears [Nietzsche] |
6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
14872 | Our knowledge is illogical, because it rests on false identities between things [Nietzsche] |
14879 | The most extreme scepticism is when you even give up logic [Nietzsche] |
6894 | Mental terms can be replaced in a sentence by a variable and an existential quantifier [Ramsey] |
6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
14873 | If we find a hypothesis that explains many things, we conclude that it explains everything [Nietzsche] |
6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
14868 | Our primary faculty is perception of structure, as when looking in a mirror [Nietzsche] |
14870 | We experience causation between willing and acting, and thereby explain conjunctions of changes [Nietzsche] |
14867 | It is just madness to think that the mind is supernatural (or even divine!) [Nietzsche] |
6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
14884 | The shortest path to happiness is forgetfulness, the path of animals (but of little value) [Nietzsche] |
14886 | Education is contrary to human nature [Nietzsche] |
14883 | We should evaluate the past morally [Nietzsche] |
14882 | Protest against vivisection - living things should not become objects of scientific investigation [Nietzsche] |
6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
14865 | We do not know the nature of one single causality [Nietzsche] |
14871 | Laws of nature are merely complex networks of relations [Nietzsche] |
9418 | All knowledge needs systematizing, and the axioms would be the laws of nature [Ramsey] |
9420 | Causal laws result from the simplest axioms of a complete deductive system [Ramsey] |
14864 | The Greeks lack a normative theology: each person has their own poetic view of things [Nietzsche] |