59 ideas
| 23183 | Different abilities are needed for living in an incomplete and undogmatic system [Nietzsche] |
| 23188 | Bad writers use shapeless floating splotches of concepts [Nietzsche] |
| 23212 | A text has many interpretations, but no 'correct' one [Nietzsche] |
| 23199 | What is the search for truth if it isn't moral? [Nietzsche] |
| 23202 | Like all philosophers, I love truth [Nietzsche] |
| 23196 | Logic is a fiction, which invents the view that one thought causes another [Nietzsche] |
| 23186 | Numbers enable us to manage the world - to the limits of counting [Nietzsche] |
| 23211 | Events are just interpretations of groups of appearances [Nietzsche] |
| 6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
| 6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
| 23201 | The 'I' does not think; it is a construction of thinking, like other useful abstractions [Nietzsche] |
| 6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
| 6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
| 6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
| 23207 | Appearance is the sole reality of things, to which all predicates refer [Nietzsche] |
| 6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
| 6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
| 6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
| 6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
| 6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
| 6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
| 6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
| 6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
| 6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
| 6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
| 6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
| 6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
| 6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
| 6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
| 23197 | Memory is essential, and is only possible by means of abbreviation signs [Nietzsche] |
| 23206 | Schematic minds think thoughts are truer if they slot into a scheme [Nietzsche] |
| 23209 | Each of our personal drives has its own perspective [Nietzsche] |
| 6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
| 6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
| 23184 | The mind is a simplifying apparatus [Nietzsche] |
| 23190 | Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life [Nietzsche] |
| 6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
| 23191 | Minds have an excluding drive to scare things off, and a selecting one to filter facts [Nietzsche] |
| 23213 | The greatest drive of life is to discharge strength, rather than preservation [Nietzsche] |
| 23210 | That all events are necessary does not mean they are compelled [Nietzsche] |
| 6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
| 23192 | Concepts don’t match one thing, but many things a little bit [Nietzsche] |
| 23189 | Concepts are rough groups of simultaneous sensations [Nietzsche] |
| 23187 | Whatever their origin, concepts survive by being useful [Nietzsche] |
| 23205 | Thought starts as ambiguity, in need of interpretation and narrowing [Nietzsche] |
| 23198 | Aesthetics can be more basic than morality, in our pleasure in certain patterns of experience [Nietzsche] |
| 20444 | If paintings could be perfectly duplicated, it would be a multiple art form [Currie, by Bacharach] |
| 23208 | Caesar and Napoleon point to the future, when they pursue their task regardless of human sacrifice [Nietzsche] |
| 23193 | Napoleon was very focused, and rightly ignored compassion [Nietzsche] |
| 23214 | For the strongest people, nihilism gives you wings! [Nietzsche] |
| 23203 | The great question is approaching, of how to govern the earth as a whole [Nietzsche] |
| 23200 | The controlling morality of aristocracy is the desire to resemble their ancestors [Nietzsche] |
| 23194 | People feel united as a nation by one language, but then want a common ancestry and history [Nietzsche] |
| 23204 | To be someone you need property, and wanting more is healthy [Nietzsche] |
| 6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
| 23195 | Laws of nature are actually formulas of power relations [Nietzsche] |
| 23185 | In chemistry every substance pushes, and thus creates new substances [Nietzsche] |