87 ideas
23183 | Different abilities are needed for living in an incomplete and undogmatic system [Nietzsche] |
23188 | Bad writers use shapeless floating splotches of concepts [Nietzsche] |
23212 | A text has many interpretations, but no 'correct' one [Nietzsche] |
23199 | What is the search for truth if it isn't moral? [Nietzsche] |
23202 | Like all philosophers, I love truth [Nietzsche] |
3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
23196 | Logic is a fiction, which invents the view that one thought causes another [Nietzsche] |
23186 | Numbers enable us to manage the world - to the limits of counting [Nietzsche] |
23211 | Events are just interpretations of groups of appearances [Nietzsche] |
6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
23201 | The 'I' does not think; it is a construction of thinking, like other useful abstractions [Nietzsche] |
6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
23207 | Appearance is the sole reality of things, to which all predicates refer [Nietzsche] |
3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
23197 | Memory is essential, and is only possible by means of abbreviation signs [Nietzsche] |
3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
23206 | Schematic minds think thoughts are truer if they slot into a scheme [Nietzsche] |
3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
23209 | Each of our personal drives has its own perspective [Nietzsche] |
3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
23184 | The mind is a simplifying apparatus [Nietzsche] |
23190 | Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life [Nietzsche] |
6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
23191 | Minds have an excluding drive to scare things off, and a selecting one to filter facts [Nietzsche] |
23213 | The greatest drive of life is to discharge strength, rather than preservation [Nietzsche] |
23210 | That all events are necessary does not mean they are compelled [Nietzsche] |
6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
23189 | Concepts are rough groups of simultaneous sensations [Nietzsche] |
23192 | Concepts don’t match one thing, but many things a little bit [Nietzsche] |
23187 | Whatever their origin, concepts survive by being useful [Nietzsche] |
3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
23205 | Thought starts as ambiguity, in need of interpretation and narrowing [Nietzsche] |
23198 | Aesthetics can be more basic than morality, in our pleasure in certain patterns of experience [Nietzsche] |
23208 | Caesar and Napoleon point to the future, when they pursue their task regardless of human sacrifice [Nietzsche] |
23193 | Napoleon was very focused, and rightly ignored compassion [Nietzsche] |
23214 | For the strongest people, nihilism gives you wings! [Nietzsche] |
23203 | The great question is approaching, of how to govern the earth as a whole [Nietzsche] |
23200 | The controlling morality of aristocracy is the desire to resemble their ancestors [Nietzsche] |
23194 | People feel united as a nation by one language, but then want a common ancestry and history [Nietzsche] |
23204 | To be someone you need property, and wanting more is healthy [Nietzsche] |
6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
23195 | Laws of nature are actually formulas of power relations [Nietzsche] |
23185 | In chemistry every substance pushes, and thus creates new substances [Nietzsche] |