56 ideas
8927 | Philosophy moves essentially in the element of universality [Hegel] |
21776 | Philosophy aims to reveal the necessity and rationality of the categories of nature and spirit [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
8935 | Without philosophy, science is barren and futile [Hegel] |
22082 | Truth does not appear by asserting reasons and then counter-reasons [Hegel] |
22035 | The structure of reason is a social and historical achievement [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
8932 | Truth does not come from giving reasons for and against propositions [Hegel] |
7077 | The true is the whole [Hegel] |
8923 | Numbers are identified by their main properties and relations, involving the successor function [MacBride] |
8926 | For mathematical objects to be positions, positions themselves must exist first [MacBride] |
6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
15611 | I develop philosophical science from the simplest appearance of immediate consciousness [Hegel, by Hegel] |
6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
8934 | Being is Thought [Hegel] |
8928 | The Absolute is not supposed to be comprehended, but felt and intuited [Hegel] |
21774 | Genuine idealism is seeing the ideal structure of the world [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
8929 | In the Absolute everything is the same [Hegel] |
21773 | Experience is immediacy, unity, forces, self-awareness, reason, culture, absolute being [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
22033 | Hegel tried to avoid Kant's dualism of neutral intuitions and imposed concepts [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
21771 | Consciousness derives its criterion of knowledge from direct knowledge of its own being [Hegel] |
6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
20741 | Consciousness is shaped dialectically, by opposing forces and concepts [Hegel, by Aho] |
21770 | Consciousness is both of objects, and of itself [Hegel] |
6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
5647 | Hegel claims knowledge of self presupposes desire, and hence objects [Hegel, by Scruton] |
5648 | For Hegel knowledge of self presupposes objects, and also a public and moral social world [Hegel, by Scruton] |
6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
8930 | The in-itself must become for-itself, which requires self-consciousness [Hegel] |
22034 | Modern life needs individuality, but must recognise that human agency is social [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
8936 | Human nature only really exists in an achieved community of minds [Hegel] |
21987 | History is the progress of the consciousness of freedom [Hegel] |
6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
8931 | The movement of pure essences constitutes the nature of scientific method [Hegel] |
8933 | Science confronts the inner necessities of objects [Hegel] |
21775 | The God of revealed religion can only be understood through pure speculative knowledge [Hegel] |
6917 | God is the essence of thought, abstracted from the thinker [Hegel, by Feuerbach] |
6915 | Hegel made the last attempt to restore Christianity, which philosophy had destroyed [Hegel, by Feuerbach] |