60 ideas
| 20121 | Grammar only reveals popular metaphysics [Nietzsche] |
| 24082 | Is the will to truth the desire to avoid deception? [Nietzsche] |
| 20360 | We Germans value becoming and development more highly than mere being of what 'is' [Nietzsche] |
| 6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
| 6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
| 12716 | The concept of forces or powers best reveals the true concept of substance [Leibniz] |
| 24077 | Necessity is thought to require an event, but is only an after-effect of the event [Nietzsche] |
| 20126 | The strength of knowledge is not its truth, but its entrenchment in our culture [Nietzsche] |
| 6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
| 6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
| 6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
| 6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
| 20119 | We became increasingly conscious of our sense impressions in order to communicate them [Nietzsche] |
| 6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
| 6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
| 6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
| 6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
| 6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
| 6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
| 6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
| 6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
| 6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
| 6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
| 6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
| 6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
| 6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
| 20122 | We have no organ for knowledge or truth; we only 'know' what is useful to the human herd [Nietzsche] |
| 4423 | We assume causes, geometry, motion, bodies etc to live, but they haven't been proved [Nietzsche] |
| 6579 | Nietzsche's perspectivism says our worldview depends on our personality [Nietzsche, by Fogelin] |
| 24083 | It would be absurd to say we are only permitted our own single perspective [Nietzsche] |
| 6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
| 6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
| 20115 | All of our normal mental life could be conducted without consciousness [Nietzsche] |
| 20117 | Only the need for communication has led to consciousness developing [Nietzsche] |
| 20118 | Only our conscious thought is verbal, and this shows the origin of consciousness [Nietzsche] |
| 20116 | Most of our lives, even the important parts, take place outside of consciousness [Nietzsche] |
| 20120 | Whatever moves into consciousness becomes thereby much more superficial [Nietzsche] |
| 6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
| 2932 | 'Know thyself' is impossible and ridiculous [Nietzsche] |
| 6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
| 24078 | Thoughts cannot be fully reproduced in words [Nietzsche] |
| 24081 | Most of our intellectual activity is unconscious [Nietzsche] |
| 2933 | Why do you listen to the voice of your conscience? [Nietzsche] |
| 20141 | Higher human beings see and hear far more than others, and do it more thoughtfully [Nietzsche] |
| 24076 | A morality ranks human drives and actions, for the sake of the herd, and subordinating individuals [Nietzsche] |
| 22471 | Nietzsche thought it 'childish' to say morality isn't binding because it varies between cultures [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
| 2935 | No two actions are the same [Nietzsche] |
| 20198 | Many virtues are harmful traps, but that is why other people praise them [Nietzsche] |
| 4275 | You cannot advocate joyful wisdom while rejecting pity, because the two are complementary [Scruton on Nietzsche] |
| 2934 | To see one's own judgement as a universal law is selfish [Nietzsche] |
| 24080 | We should give style to our character - by applying an artistic plan to its strengths and weaknesses [Nietzsche] |
| 20125 | The ethical teacher exists to give purpose to what happens necessarily and without purpose [Nietzsche] |
| 9306 | To ward off boredom at any cost is vulgar [Nietzsche] |
| 24079 | The best life is the dangerous life [Nietzsche] |
| 2936 | Imagine if before each of your actions you had to accept repeating the action over and over again [Nietzsche] |
| 6842 | Nietzsche says facing up to the eternal return of meaninglessness is the response to nihilism [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
| 6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
| 2931 | God is dead, and we have killed him [Nietzsche] |