109 ideas
12926 | Wisdom is the science of happiness [Leibniz] |
12903 | Wise people have fewer acts of will, because such acts are linked together [Leibniz] |
12644 | Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy [Fodor] |
12914 | Metaphysics is geometrical, resting on non-contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
12633 | Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension [Fodor] |
12915 | Definitions can only be real if the item is possible [Leibniz] |
12910 | The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition [Leibniz] |
19333 | A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject [Leibniz] |
12664 | A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor] |
12648 | Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor] |
12650 | 'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor] |
12656 | P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor] |
12920 | There is no multiplicity without true units [Leibniz] |
12319 | What is not truly one being is not truly a being either [Leibniz] |
12922 | A thing 'expresses' another if they have a constant and fixed relationship [Leibniz] |
6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
13079 | A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth [Leibniz] |
12745 | Philosophy needs the precision of the unity given by substances [Leibniz] |
12921 | Accidental unity has degrees, from a mob to a society to a machine or organism [Leibniz] |
12746 | We find unity in reason, and unity in perception, but these are not true unity [Leibniz] |
12916 | A body is a unified aggregate, unless it has an indivisible substance [Leibniz] |
12919 | Unity needs an indestructible substance, to contain everything which will happen to it [Leibniz] |
12923 | Every bodily substance must have a soul, or something analogous to a soul [Leibniz] |
12704 | Aggregates don’t reduce to points, or atoms, or illusion, so must reduce to substance [Leibniz] |
13077 | Basic predicates give the complete concept, which then predicts all of the actions [Leibniz] |
12908 | Essences exist in the divine understanding [Leibniz] |
12706 | Bodies need a soul (or something like it) to avoid being mere phenomena [Leibniz] |
12906 | Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz] |
12653 | There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility [Fodor] |
12904 | If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz] |
11981 | If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual [Leibniz] |
12651 | Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone' [Fodor] |
12628 | Knowing that must come before knowing how [Fodor] |
12905 | I cannot think my non-existence, nor exist without being myself [Leibniz] |
19334 | I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard [Leibniz] |
6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
12625 | Pragmatism is the worst idea ever [Fodor] |
5033 | Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations [Leibniz] |
6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
12913 | Nature is explained by mathematics and mechanism, but the laws rest on metaphysics [Leibniz] |
13089 | To fully conceive the subject is to explain the resulting predicates and events [Leibniz] |
5034 | Mind is a thinking substance which can know God and eternal truths [Leibniz] |
12636 | Mental states have causal powers [Fodor] |
5032 | It seems probable that animals have souls, but not consciousness [Leibniz] |
6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
12661 | The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor] |
5031 | Everything which happens is not necessary, but is certain after God chooses this universe [Leibniz] |
12632 | In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor] |
6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
12624 | Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor] |
12640 | Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor] |
12641 | Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor] |
12643 | Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor] |
12647 | Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor] |
12649 | We think in file names [Fodor] |
12655 | Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor] |
12630 | If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor] |
12911 | Concepts are what unite a proposition [Leibniz] |
12658 | Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor] |
12662 | We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor] |
12635 | Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor] |
12652 | Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor] |
12626 | Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor] |
12637 | Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor] |
12638 | If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor] |
12639 | Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor] |
12654 | You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor] |
12659 | Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor] |
12660 | One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor] |
12629 | For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor] |
12631 | Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor] |
12657 | Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor] |
12634 | 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor] |
12642 | Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor] |
12663 | We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor] |
12645 | Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor] |
12646 | Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor] |
12627 | Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor] |
12925 | Beauty increases with familiarity [Leibniz] |
12927 | Happiness is advancement towards perfection [Leibniz] |
15955 | I think the corpuscular theory, rather than forms or qualities, best explains particular phenomena [Leibniz] |
6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
12907 | Each possible world contains its own laws, reflected in the possible individuals of that world [Leibniz] |
12924 | Motion alone is relative, but force is real, and establishes its subject [Leibniz] |
12909 | Everything, even miracles, belongs to order [Leibniz] |
5030 | Miracles are extraordinary operations by God, but are nevertheless part of his design [Leibniz] |
12912 | Immortality without memory is useless [Leibniz] |
12917 | The soul is indestructible and always self-aware [Leibniz] |
12918 | Animals have souls, but lack consciousness [Leibniz] |