58 ideas
| 21955 | My dogmatic slumber was first interrupted by David Hume [Kant] |
| 16931 | Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic [Kant] |
| 16918 | Mathematics cannot proceed just by the analysis of concepts [Kant] |
| 16919 | Geometry rests on our intuition of space [Kant] |
| 16930 | Geometry is not analytic, because a line's being 'straight' is a quality [Kant] |
| 16920 | Numbers are formed by addition of units in time [Kant] |
| 16929 | 7+5 = 12 is not analytic, because no analysis of 7+5 will reveal the concept of 12 [Kant] |
| 16910 | Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure [Kant] |
| 16917 | All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time [Kant] |
| 16928 | Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori [Kant] |
| 6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
| 6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
| 11833 | The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant] |
| 21957 | 'Transcendental' concerns how we know, rather than what we know [Kant] |
| 6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
| 6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
| 6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
| 6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
| 16923 | I admit there are bodies outside us [Kant] |
| 21441 | 'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience [Kant] |
| 16916 | A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves [Kant] |
| 16915 | A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses [Kant] |
| 16914 | A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility [Kant] |
| 6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
| 6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
| 6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
| 6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
| 21447 | I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object [Kant] |
| 6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
| 6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
| 6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
| 16924 | I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant] |
| 6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
| 16913 | I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant] |
| 6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
| 6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
| 6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
| 6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
| 6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
| 16925 | Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience [Kant] |
| 16911 | Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object [Kant] |
| 6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
| 6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
| 6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
| 2170 | Homer does not distinguish between soul and body [Homer, by Williams,B] |
| 6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
| 16912 | Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause [Kant] |
| 16926 | Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject [Kant] |
| 16927 | Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject [Kant] |
| 2171 | The 'will' doesn't exist; there is just conclusion, then action [Homer, by Williams,B] |
| 21819 | Plato says the Good produces the Intellectual-Principle, which in turn produces the Soul [Homer, by Plotinus] |
| 11388 | Let there be one ruler [Homer] |
| 6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
| 16922 | Space must have three dimensions, because only three lines can meet at right angles [Kant] |
| 16921 | If all empirical sensation of bodies is removed, space and time are still left [Kant] |
| 14829 | Homer so enjoys the company of the gods that he must have been deeply irreligious [Homer, by Nietzsche] |