46 ideas
| 21021 | Keep premises as weak as possible, to avoid controversial difficulties [Nussbaum] |
| 21548 | The null class is the class with all the non-existents as its members [MacColl, by Lackey] |
| 6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
| 6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
| 6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
| 6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
| 6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
| 6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
| 6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
| 6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
| 6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
| 6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
| 6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
| 6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
| 6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
| 6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
| 6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
| 6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
| 6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
| 6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
| 6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
| 6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
| 6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
| 6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
| 6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
| 21007 | Storytelling is never neutral; some features of the world must be emphasised [Nussbaum] |
| 21025 | Particularism gives no guidance for the future [Nussbaum] |
| 21026 | Compassion is unreliable, because it favours people close to us [Nussbaum] |
| 21019 | Social contracts assume equal powers among the participants [Nussbaum] |
| 21011 | We shouldn't focus on actual preferences, which may be distorted by injustices [Nussbaum] |
| 21008 | Liberalism does not need a comprehensive account of value [Nussbaum] |
| 21012 | Women are often treated like children, and not respected for their choices [Nussbaum] |
| 21015 | Negative liberty is incoherent; all liberties, to do and to be, require the prevention of interference [Nussbaum] |
| 21017 | Political freedom is an incoherent project, because some freedoms limit other freedoms [Nussbaum] |
| 21016 | Political and civil rights are not separate from economic and social rights [Nussbaum] |
| 21009 | Capabilities: Life, Health, Safety, Mental life, Love, Planning, Joining in, Nature, Play, Control [Nussbaum, by PG] |
| 21010 | Justice requires that the ten main capabilities of people are reasonably enabled [Nussbaum] |
| 21013 | Capabilities are grounded in bare humanity and agency; qualifying as rational is not needed [Nussbaum] |
| 21014 | Rights are not just barriers against state interference; governments must affirm capabilities of citizens [Nussbaum] |
| 21020 | Any establishment belief system is incompatible with full respect for all citizens [Nussbaum] |
| 21023 | We should respect animals in the way that we respect the animal nature in humans [Nussbaum] |
| 21024 | It may be no harm to kill an animal which cannot plan for its future [Nussbaum] |
| 21022 | The Capabilities Approach sees animals as agents, not just as having feelings [Nussbaum] |
| 6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |