105 ideas
| 21887 | Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida] |
| 21888 | Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida] |
| 21896 | Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May] |
| 21893 | Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida] |
| 21892 | Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida] |
| 20925 | Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
| 20934 | Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
| 21895 | Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida] |
| 21934 | The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21883 | Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida] |
| 21882 | Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida] |
| 21881 | We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida] |
| 4756 | Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel] |
| 21877 | True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida] |
| 8625 | What physical facts could underlie 0 or 1, or very large numbers? [Frege on Mill] |
| 17895 | Combining two distinct assertions does not necessarily lead to a single 'complex proposition' [Mill] |
| 10427 | All names are names of something, real or imaginary [Mill] |
| 21878 | Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida] |
| 21889 | 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida] |
| 4944 | Mill says names have denotation but not connotation [Mill, by Kripke] |
| 7762 | Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object [Mill, by Lycan] |
| 21879 | Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida] |
| 9801 | Numbers must be assumed to have identical units, as horses are equalised in 'horse-power' [Mill] |
| 8742 | The only axioms needed are for equality, addition, and successive numbers [Mill, by Shapiro] |
| 9800 | Arithmetic is based on definitions, and Sums of equals are equal, and Differences of equals are equal [Mill] |
| 5201 | Mill says logic and maths is induction based on a very large number of instances [Mill, by Ayer] |
| 9360 | If two black and two white objects in practice produced five, what colour is the fifth one? [Lewis,CI on Mill] |
| 9888 | Mill mistakes particular applications as integral to arithmetic, instead of general patterns [Dummett on Mill] |
| 9794 | There are no such things as numbers in the abstract [Mill] |
| 9796 | Things possess the properties of numbers, as quantity, and as countable parts [Mill] |
| 9795 | Numbers have generalised application to entities (such as bodies or sounds) [Mill] |
| 9798 | Different parcels made from three pebbles produce different actual sensations [Mill] |
| 9797 | '2 pebbles and 1 pebble' and '3 pebbles' name the same aggregation, but different facts [Mill] |
| 9799 | 3=2+1 presupposes collections of objects ('Threes'), which may be divided thus [Mill] |
| 9802 | Numbers denote physical properties of physical phenomena [Mill] |
| 9803 | We can't easily distinguish 102 horses from 103, but we could arrange them to make it obvious [Mill] |
| 9804 | Arithmetical results give a mode of formation of a given number [Mill] |
| 9805 | 12 is the cube of 1728 means pebbles can be aggregated a certain way [Mill] |
| 8741 | Numbers must be of something; they don't exist as abstractions [Mill] |
| 12411 | Mill is too imprecise, and is restricted to simple arithmetic [Kitcher on Mill] |
| 5656 | Empirical theories of arithmetic ignore zero, limit our maths, and need probability to get started [Frege on Mill] |
| 9624 | Numbers are a very general property of objects [Mill, by Brown,JR] |
| 6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
| 6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
| 9806 | Whatever is made up of parts is made up of parts of those parts [Mill] |
| 11156 | The essence is that without which a thing can neither be, nor be conceived to be [Mill] |
| 12190 | Necessity is what will be, despite any alternative suppositions whatever [Mill] |
| 22623 | Necessity can only mean what must be, without conditions of any kind [Mill] |
| 6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
| 6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
| 6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
| 6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
| 6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
| 6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
| 6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
| 6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
| 6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
| 6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
| 6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
| 6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
| 6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
| 6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
| 6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
| 16859 | Most perception is one-tenth observation and nine-tenths inference [Mill] |
| 6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
| 6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
| 9082 | Clear concepts result from good observation, extensive experience, and accurate memory [Mill] |
| 16860 | Inductive generalisation is more reliable than one of its instances; they can't all be wrong [Mill] |
| 16845 | The whole theory of induction rests on causes [Mill] |
| 16843 | Mill's methods (Difference,Agreement,Residues,Concomitance,Hypothesis) don't nail induction [Mill, by Lipton] |
| 17086 | Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience [Mill, by Ruben] |
| 6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
| 6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
| 17091 | Explanation is fitting of facts into ever more general patterns of regularity [Mill, by Ruben] |
| 16805 | Causal inference is by spotting either Agreements or Differences [Mill, by Lipton] |
| 16835 | The Methods of Difference and of Agreement are forms of inference to the best explanation [Mill, by Lipton] |
| 21890 | Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida] |
| 6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
| 9079 | We can focus our minds on what is common to a whole class, neglecting other aspects [Mill] |
| 9081 | We don't recognise comparisons by something in our minds; the concepts result from the comparisons [Mill] |
| 6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
| 21880 | 'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida] |
| 9080 | General conceptions are a necessary preliminary to Induction [Mill] |
| 9078 | The study of the nature of Abstract Ideas does not belong to logic, but to a different science [Mill] |
| 21886 | Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida] |
| 21930 | For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida] |
| 21884 | Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida] |
| 21935 | The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida] |
| 21933 | Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21894 | Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida] |
| 21931 | 'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21885 | Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida] |
| 21891 | The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida] |
| 6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
| 8345 | A cause is the total of all the conditions which inevitably produce the result [Mill] |
| 10391 | Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill] |
| 14547 | The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill] |
| 8377 | Causation is just invariability of succession between every natural fact and a preceding fact [Mill] |
| 14545 | A cause is an antecedent which invariably and unconditionally leads to a phenomenon [Mill] |
| 4773 | Mill's regularity theory of causation is based on an effect preceded by a conjunction of causes [Mill, by Psillos] |
| 4775 | In Mill's 'Method of Agreement' cause is the common factor in a range of different cases [Mill, by Psillos] |
| 4776 | In Mill's 'Method of Difference' the cause is what stops the effect when it is removed [Mill, by Psillos] |
| 9417 | What are the fewest propositions from which all natural uniformities could be inferred? [Mill] |