50 ideas
8092 | Logic was merely a branch of rhetoric until the scientific 17th century [Devlin] |
20320 | Truth is what unites, and the profound truths create a community [Jaspers] |
8081 | 'No councillors are bankers' and 'All bankers are athletes' implies 'Some athletes are not councillors' [Devlin] |
8085 | Modern propositional inference replaces Aristotle's 19 syllogisms with modus ponens [Devlin] |
8086 | Predicate logic retains the axioms of propositional logic [Devlin] |
8091 | Situation theory is logic that takes account of context [Devlin] |
8089 | Montague's intensional logic incorporated the notion of meaning [Devlin] |
8087 | Golden ages: 1900-1960 for pure logic, and 1950-1985 for applied logic [Devlin] |
8082 | Where a conditional is purely formal, an implication implies a link between premise and conclusion [Devlin] |
8072 | Sentences of apparent identical form can have different contextual meanings [Devlin] |
8075 | Space and time are atomic in the arrow, and divisible in the tortoise [Devlin] |
6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
8088 | People still say the Hopi have no time concepts, despite Whorf's later denial [Devlin] |
6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
20323 | Freedom needs knowledge, the possibility of arbitrariness, and law [Jaspers] |
20322 | I am aware that freedom is possible, and the freedom is not in theory, but in seeking freedom [Jaspers] |
6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
8073 | How do we parse 'time flies like an arrow' and 'fruit flies like an apple'? [Devlin] |
8076 | The distinction between sentences and abstract propositions is crucial in logic [Devlin] |
20324 | My freedom increases as I broaden my vision of possiblities and motives [Jaspers] |
20321 | The struggle for Existenz is between people who are equals, and are utterly honest [Jaspers] |
20318 | My helplessness in philosophising reveals my being, and begins its upsurge [Jaspers] |
20325 | Once we grasp freedom 'from' things, then freedom 'for' things becomes urgent [Jaspers] |
20315 | 'Existenz' is the potential being, which I could have, and ought to have [Jaspers] |
20317 | Mundane existence is general, falling under universals, but Existens is unique to individuals [Jaspers] |
20319 | We want the correct grasp on being that is neither solipsism nor absorption in the crowd [Jaspers] |
20316 | Every decision I make moves towards or away from fulfilled Existenz [Jaspers] |
6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |