46 ideas
24032 | Clever scholars can obscure things which are obvious even to peasants [Descartes] |
24033 | Most scholastic disputes concern words, where agreeing on meanings would settle them [Descartes] |
24024 | The secret of the method is to recognise which thing in a series is the simplest [Descartes] |
24018 | One truth leads us to another [Descartes] |
24036 | I can only see the proportion of two to three if there is a common measure - their unity [Descartes] |
24035 | Unity is something shared by many things, so in that respect they are equals [Descartes] |
24029 | Among the simples are the graspable negations, such as rest and instants [Descartes] |
6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
24030 | 3+4=7 is necessary because we cannot conceive of seven without including three and four [Descartes] |
24019 | If we accept mere probabilities as true we undermine our existing knowledge [Descartes] |
24031 | When Socrates doubts, he know he doubts, and that truth is possible [Descartes] |
24020 | We all see intuitively that we exist, where intuition is attentive, clear and distinct rational understanding [Descartes] |
6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
24025 | Clear and distinct truths must be known all at once (unlike deductions) [Descartes] |
24022 | Our souls possess divine seeds of knowledge, which can bear spontaneous fruit [Descartes] |
6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
24034 | If someone had only seen the basic colours, they could deduce the others from resemblance [Descartes] |
24021 | The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction [Descartes] |
6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
24027 | Nerves and movement originate in the brain, where imagination moves them [Descartes] |
6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
24026 | Our four knowledge faculties are intelligence, imagination, the senses, and memory [Descartes] |
22352 | Out of more than a hundred planets, Earth is the only one with the idea of free will [Vonnegut] |
24028 | The force by which we know things is spiritual, and quite distinct from the body [Descartes] |
6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
24023 | All the sciences searching for order and measure are related to mathematics [Descartes] |
6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |