54 ideas
| 23853 | Truth is not a object we love - it is the radiant manifestation of reality [Weil] |
| 9193 | ZF set theory has variables which range over sets, 'equals' and 'member', and extensionality [Dummett] |
| 9194 | The main alternative to ZF is one which includes looser classes as well as sets [Dummett] |
| 9195 | Intuitionists reject excluded middle, not for a third value, but for possibility of proof [Dummett] |
| 9186 | First-order logic concerns objects; second-order adds properties, kinds, relations and functions [Dummett] |
| 9187 | Logical truths and inference are characterized either syntactically or semantically [Dummett] |
| 9191 | Ordinals seem more basic than cardinals, since we count objects in sequence [Dummett] |
| 9192 | The number 4 has different positions in the naturals and the wholes, with the same structure [Dummett] |
| 23855 | Creation produced a network or web of determinations [Weil] |
| 6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
| 6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
| 6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
| 6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
| 6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
| 6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
| 6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
| 6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
| 6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
| 6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
| 6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
| 6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
| 6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
| 6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
| 6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
| 6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
| 6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
| 6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
| 6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
| 6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
| 6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
| 6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
| 6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
| 23848 | The aesthete's treatment of beauty as amusement is sacreligious; beauty should nourish [Weil] |
| 23854 | Beauty is the proof of what is good [Weil] |
| 23837 | Respect is our only obligation, which can only be expressed through deeds, not words [Weil] |
| 23844 | The most important human need is to have multiple roots [Weil] |
| 23838 | The need for order stands above all others, and is understood via the other needs [Weil] |
| 23836 | Obligations only bind individuals, not collectives [Weil] |
| 23840 | A citizen should be able to understand the whole of society [Weil] |
| 23843 | Even the poorest should feel collective ownership, and participation in grand display [Weil] |
| 23846 | Culture is an instrument for creating an ongoing succession of teachers [Weil] |
| 23839 | A lifelong head of society should only be a symbol, not a ruler [Weil] |
| 23842 | Party politics in a democracy can't avoid an anti-democratic party [Weil] |
| 23847 | Socialism tends to make a proletariat of the whole population [Weil] |
| 23845 | The capitalists neglect the people and the nation, and even their own interests [Weil] |
| 23841 | By making money the sole human measure, inequality has become universal [Weil] |
| 23835 | People have duties, and only have rights because of the obligations of others to them [Weil] |
| 23852 | To punish people we must ourselves be innocent - but that undermines the desire to punish [Weil] |
| 23850 | The soldier-civilian distinction should be abolished; every citizen is committed to a war [Weil] |
| 23851 | Education is essentially motivation [Weil] |
| 6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
| 23849 | Religion should quietly suffuse all human life with its light [Weil] |