97 ideas
| 20801 | A wise man's chief strength is not being tricked; nothing is worse than error, frivolity or rashness [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero] |
| 1771 | When shown seven versions of the mowing argument, he paid twice the asking price for them [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 20770 | Philosophy has three parts, studying nature, character, and rational discourse [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 6022 | Someone who says 'it is day' proposes it is day, and it is true if it is day [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 10073 | There cannot be a set theory which is complete [Smith,P] |
| 10616 | Second-order arithmetic can prove new sentences of first-order [Smith,P] |
| 10075 | A 'partial function' maps only some elements to another set [Smith,P] |
| 10074 | A 'total function' maps every element to one element in another set [Smith,P] |
| 10612 | An argument is a 'fixed point' for a function if it is mapped back to itself [Smith,P] |
| 10076 | The 'range' of a function is the set of elements in the output set created by the function [Smith,P] |
| 10605 | Two functions are the same if they have the same extension [Smith,P] |
| 10615 | The Comprehension Schema says there is a property only had by things satisfying a condition [Smith,P] |
| 10595 | A 'theorem' of a theory is a sentence derived from the axioms using the proof system [Smith,P] |
| 10602 | A 'natural deduction system' has no axioms but many rules [Smith,P] |
| 10613 | No nice theory can define truth for its own language [Smith,P] |
| 10078 | An 'injective' ('one-to-one') function creates a distinct output element from each original [Smith,P] |
| 10077 | A 'surjective' ('onto') function creates every element of the output set [Smith,P] |
| 10079 | A 'bijective' function has one-to-one correspondence in both directions [Smith,P] |
| 10070 | If everything that a theory proves is true, then it is 'sound' [Smith,P] |
| 10086 | Soundness is true axioms and a truth-preserving proof system [Smith,P] |
| 10596 | A theory is 'sound' iff every theorem is true (usually from true axioms and truth-preservation) [Smith,P] |
| 10598 | A theory is 'negation complete' if it proves all sentences or their negation [Smith,P] |
| 10597 | 'Complete' applies both to whole logics, and to theories within them [Smith,P] |
| 10069 | A theory is 'negation complete' if one of its sentences or its negation can always be proved [Smith,P] |
| 10609 | Two routes to Incompleteness: semantics of sound/expressible, or syntax of consistency/proof [Smith,P] |
| 10080 | 'Effective' means simple, unintuitive, independent, controlled, dumb, and terminating [Smith,P] |
| 10087 | A theory is 'decidable' if all of its sentences could be mechanically proved [Smith,P] |
| 10088 | Any consistent, axiomatized, negation-complete formal theory is decidable [Smith,P] |
| 10081 | A set is 'enumerable' is all of its elements can result from a natural number function [Smith,P] |
| 10083 | A set is 'effectively enumerable' if a computer could eventually list every member [Smith,P] |
| 10084 | A finite set of finitely specifiable objects is always effectively enumerable (e.g. primes) [Smith,P] |
| 10085 | The set of ordered pairs of natural numbers <i,j> is effectively enumerable [Smith,P] |
| 10601 | The thorems of a nice arithmetic can be enumerated, but not the truths (so they're diffferent) [Smith,P] |
| 10600 | Being 'expressible' depends on language; being 'capture/represented' depends on axioms and proof system [Smith,P] |
| 10599 | For primes we write (x not= 1 ∧ ∀u∀v(u x v = x → (u = 1 ∨ v = 1))) [Smith,P] |
| 10610 | The reals contain the naturals, but the theory of reals doesn't contain the theory of naturals [Smith,P] |
| 10619 | The truths of arithmetic are just true equations and their universally quantified versions [Smith,P] |
| 7555 | Zeno achieved the statement of the problems of infinitesimals, infinity and continuity [Russell on Zeno of Citium] |
| 10618 | All numbers are related to zero by the ancestral of the successor relation [Smith,P] |
| 10608 | The number of Fs is the 'successor' of the Gs if there is a single F that isn't G [Smith,P] |
| 10849 | Baby arithmetic covers addition and multiplication, but no general facts about numbers [Smith,P] |
| 10850 | Baby Arithmetic is complete, but not very expressive [Smith,P] |
| 10852 | Robinson Arithmetic (Q) is not negation complete [Smith,P] |
| 10851 | Robinson Arithmetic 'Q' has basic axioms, quantifiers and first-order logic [Smith,P] |
| 10068 | Natural numbers have zero, unique successors, unending, no circling back, and no strays [Smith,P] |
| 10603 | The logic of arithmetic must quantify over properties of numbers to handle induction [Smith,P] |
| 10848 | Multiplication only generates incompleteness if combined with addition and successor [Smith,P] |
| 10604 | Incompleteness results in arithmetic from combining addition and successor with multiplication [Smith,P] |
| 20860 | Whatever participates in substance exists [Zeno of Citium, by Stobaeus] |
| 6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
| 10617 | The 'ancestral' of a relation is a new relation which creates a long chain of the original relation [Smith,P] |
| 6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
| 21397 | Perception an open hand, a fist is 'grasping', and holding that fist is knowledge [Zeno of Citium, by Long] |
| 20799 | A grasp by the senses is true, because it leaves nothing out, and so nature endorses it [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero] |
| 6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
| 6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
| 6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
| 6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
| 6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
| 6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
| 6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
| 6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
| 6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
| 6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
| 6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
| 6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
| 6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
| 6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
| 6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
| 6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
| 6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
| 20797 | If a grasped perception cannot be shaken by argument, it is 'knowledge' [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero] |
| 21398 | A presentation is true if we judge that no false presentation could appear like it [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero] |
| 6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
| 6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
| 6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
| 1770 | When a slave said 'It was fated that I should steal', Zeno replied 'Yes, and that you should be beaten' [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 3799 | A dog tied to a cart either chooses to follow and is pulled, or it is just pulled [Zeno of Citium, by Hippolytus] |
| 21402 | Incorporeal substances can't do anything, and can't be acted upon either [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero] |
| 6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
| 20816 | A body is required for anything to have causal relations [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero] |
| 1773 | A sentence always has signification, but a word by itself never does [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 20841 | Zeno said live in agreement with nature, which accords with virtue [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1774 | Since we are essentially rational animals, living according to reason is living according to nature [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 20863 | The goal is to 'live in agreement', according to one rational consistent principle [Zeno of Citium, by Stobaeus] |
| 2662 | Zeno saw virtue as a splendid state, not just a source of splendid action [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero] |
| 21395 | One of Zeno's books was 'That Which is Appropriate' [Zeno of Citium, by Long] |
| 5964 | Zeno says there are four main virtues, which are inseparable but distinct [Zeno of Citium, by Plutarch] |
| 6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
| 20822 | There is no void in the cosmos, but indefinite void outside it [Zeno of Citium, by Ps-Plutarch] |
| 2648 | Things are more perfect if they have reason; nothing is more perfect than the universe, so it must have reason [Zeno of Citium] |
| 20811 | Since the cosmos produces what is alive and rational, it too must be alive and rational [Zeno of Citium] |
| 20810 | Rational is better than non-rational; the cosmos is supreme, so it is rational [Zeno of Citium] |
| 2649 | If tuneful flutes grew on olive trees, you would assume the olive had some knowledge of the flute [Zeno of Citium] |
| 20807 | The cosmos and heavens are the substance of god [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius] |