57 ideas
| 162 | Can we understand an individual soul without knowing the soul in general? [Plato] |
| 160 | The highest ability in man is the ability to discuss unity and plurality in the nature of things [Plato] |
| 166 | A speaker should be able to divide a subject, right down to the limits of divisibility [Plato] |
| 7953 | Reasoning needs to cut nature accurately at the joints [Plato] |
| 6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
| 16121 | I revere anyone who can discern a single thing that encompasses many things [Plato] |
| 6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
| 153 | It takes a person to understand, by using universals, and by using reason to create a unity out of sense-impressions [Plato] |
| 154 | We would have an overpowering love of knowledge if we had a pure idea of it - as with the other Forms [Plato] |
| 19718 | Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann] |
| 6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
| 6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
| 6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
| 6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
| 6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
| 6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
| 6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
| 6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
| 6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
| 6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
| 6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
| 6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
| 6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
| 6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
| 6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
| 6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
| 6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
| 151 | True knowledge is of the reality behind sense experience [Plato] |
| 19717 | Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann] |
| 19716 | Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann] |
| 19715 | You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann] |
| 19713 | Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann] |
| 19714 | Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann] |
| 19719 | 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann] |
| 165 | If the apparent facts strongly conflict with probability, it is in everyone's interests to suppress the facts [Plato] |
| 6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
| 6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
| 9296 | The soul is self-motion [Plato] |
| 6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
| 6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
| 23997 | Plato saw emotions and appetites as wild horses, in need of taming [Plato, by Goldie] |
| 159 | Only a good philosopher can be a good speaker [Plato] |
| 5946 | 'Phaedrus' pioneers the notion of philosophical rhetoric [Lawson-Tancred on Plato] |
| 158 | An excellent speech seems to imply a knowledge of the truth in the mind of the speaker [Plato] |
| 155 | Beauty is the clearest and most lovely of the Forms [Plato] |
| 143 | The two ruling human principles are the natural desire for pleasure, and an acquired love of virtue [Plato] |
| 157 | Most pleasure is release from pain, and is therefore not worthwhile [Plato] |
| 144 | Reason impels us towards excellence, which teaches us self-control [Plato] |
| 156 | Bad people are never really friends with one another [Plato] |
| 6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
| 148 | If the prime origin is destroyed, it will not come into being again out of anything [Plato] |
| 152 | The mind of God is fully satisfied and happy with a vision of reality and truth [Plato] |
| 150 | We cannot conceive of God, so we have to think of Him as an immortal version of ourselves [Plato] |
| 149 | There isn't a single reason for positing the existence of immortal beings [Plato] |
| 146 | Soul is always in motion, so it must be self-moving and immortal [Plato] |