50 ideas
3656 | The greatest good for a state is true philosophers [Descartes] |
6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
16744 | All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes] |
5016 | Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes] |
5015 | A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes] |
16630 | If we perceive an attribute, we infer the existence of some substance [Descartes] |
5013 | A substance needs nothing else in order to exist [Descartes] |
16633 | A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes] |
3658 | Total doubt can't include your existence while doubting [Descartes] |
5005 | I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction [Descartes] |
5006 | 'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding [Descartes] |
6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
5012 | 'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind [Descartes] |
6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
5004 | We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes] |
6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
5014 | We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation [Descartes] |
6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
5017 | In thinking we shut ourselves off from other substances, showing our identity and separateness [Descartes] |
5010 | Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea [Descartes] |
5011 | There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes] |
5018 | Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes] |
6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
5007 | Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts [Descartes] |
8212 | Everything that is experienced in consciousness is meaning [Derrida] |
5009 | We do not praise the acts of an efficient automaton, as their acts are necessary [Descartes] |
5008 | The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame [Descartes] |
15987 | Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes] |
12730 | We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes [Descartes] |
16601 | Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes] |
6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |