52 ideas
3240 | There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions [Nagel] |
3242 | Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it [Nagel] |
3241 | It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds [Nagel] |
3248 | Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective [Nagel] |
20989 | Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species [Nagel] |
22354 | Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' [Nagel, by Reiss/Sprenger] |
6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
20945 | Belief is no more rational than is tasting and smelling [Hamann] |
6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
3249 | Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities [Nagel] |
22429 | We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities [Nagel] |
6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
3247 | Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge [Nagel] |
3252 | Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible [Nagel] |
3251 | Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity [Nagel] |
6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
3244 | Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel] |
3245 | The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel] |
3246 | I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two [Nagel] |
6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
3257 | Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel] |
3265 | We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death [Nagel] |
3263 | If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning [Nagel] |
3256 | Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance [Nagel] |
3261 | Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable [Nagel] |
3258 | If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties [Nagel] |
3254 | If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory [Nagel] |
3264 | We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values [Nagel] |
3255 | We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives [Nagel] |
3262 | Utilitarianism is too demanding [Nagel] |
6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
7666 | God is not a mathematician, but a poet [Hamann, by Berlin] |