Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Perception', 'Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000' and 'reports'

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55 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is a more powerful persuader than gold [Democritus (attr)]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H]
Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H]
Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H]
Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H]
If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H]
For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H]
Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H]
If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H]
If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge]
Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty is merely animal without intelligence [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Behave well when alone, and feel shame in you own eyes [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Good breeding in men means having a good character [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
We should only choose pleasures which are concerned with the beautiful [Democritus (attr)]
Good and true are the same for everyone, but pleasures differ [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Only accept beneficial pleasures [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works [Democritus (attr)]
Moderation brings more pleasures, and so increases pleasure [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not an adult [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
It is as brave to master pleasure as to overcome the enemy [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
A bad life is just a drawn-out death [Democritus (attr)]
Virtue doesn't just avoid evil, but also doesn't desire it [Democritus (attr)]
Be virtuous from duty, not from fear [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Repentance of shameful deeds is salvation [Democritus (attr)]
Virtue comes more from practice than from nature [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the person wronged [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
The endless desire for money is a crueller slavery than poverty [Democritus (attr)]
Small appetite makes poverty equal to wealth [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
It is better to have one intelligent friend than many unintelligent [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty [Democritus (attr)]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
It is better to be poor in a democracy than be rich without freedom [Democritus (attr)]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H]