48 ideas
| 354 | Wisdom makes virtue and true goodness possible [Plato] |
| 370 | Philosophy is a purification of the soul ready for the afterlife [Plato] |
| 350 | In investigation the body leads us astray, but the soul gets a clear view of the facts [Plato] |
| 362 | The greatest misfortune for a person is to develop a dislike for argument [Plato] |
| 13155 | If you add one to one, which one becomes two, or do they both become two? [Plato] |
| 18198 | Mathematics is part of science; transfinite mathematics I take as mostly uninterpreted [Quine] |
| 6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
| 21347 | If Simmias is taller than Socrates, that isn't a feature that is just in Simmias [Plato] |
| 6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
| 360 | We must have a prior knowledge of equality, if we see 'equal' things and realise they fall short of it [Plato] |
| 1 | There is only one source for all beauty [Plato] |
| 368 | Other things are named after the Forms because they participate in them [Plato] |
| 16516 | The ship which Theseus took to Crete is now sent to Delos crowned with flowers [Plato] |
| 6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
| 6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
| 6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
| 6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
| 357 | People are obviously recollecting when they react to a geometrical diagram [Plato] |
| 359 | If we feel the inadequacy of a resemblance, we must recollect the original [Plato] |
| 9343 | To achieve pure knowledge, we must get rid of the body and contemplate things with the soul [Plato] |
| 6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
| 6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
| 6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
| 6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
| 6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
| 6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
| 6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
| 6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
| 6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
| 6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
| 6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
| 6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
| 6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
| 6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
| 6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
| 15859 | To investigate the causes of things, study what is best for them [Plato] |
| 13154 | Do we think and experience with blood, air or fire, or could it be our brain? [Plato] |
| 6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
| 364 | One soul can't be more or less of a soul than another [Plato] |
| 6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
| 361 | It is a mistake to think that the most violent pleasure or pain is therefore the truest reality [Plato] |
| 351 | War aims at the acquisition of wealth, because we are enslaved to the body [Plato] |
| 6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
| 13156 | Fancy being unable to distinguish a cause from its necessary background conditions! [Plato] |
| 369 | If the Earth is spherical and in the centre, it is kept in place by universal symmetry, not by force [Plato] |
| 363 | Whether the soul pre-exists our body depends on whether it contains the ultimate standard of reality [Plato] |