Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Emergence of Probability', 'Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good' and 'Moral Relativism'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
7454 Gassendi is the first great empiricist philosopher [Hacking]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
7447 Probability was fully explained between 1654 and 1812 [Hacking]
7448 Probability is statistical (behaviour of chance devices) or epistemological (belief based on evidence) [Hacking]
7449 Epistemological probability based either on logical implications or coherent judgments [Hacking]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
22449 When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
7450 In the medieval view, only deduction counted as true evidence [Hacking]
7451 Formerly evidence came from people; the new idea was that things provided evidence [Hacking]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
7452 An experiment is a test, or an adventure, or a diagnosis, or a dissection [Hacking, by PG]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
7459 Follow maths for necessary truths, and jurisprudence for contingent truths [Hacking]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
6248 Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
22451 All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6238 We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson]
6239 We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson]
6240 The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson]
6242 We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson]
6247 Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
22452 Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
6244 Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
6243 As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
6246 My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
6241 Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
6245 That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
6251 The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
6250 We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
6249 If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson]