Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truth, Correspondence, Explanation and Knowledge', 'The Meaning of 'Meaning'' and 'Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

23 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18487 We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
15134 The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
15141 Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson]
15140 The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
15131 If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
15135 If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson]
15139 Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
18492 Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
15136 Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15138 Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
18488 We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge]
15137 If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
18890 Putnam smuggles essentialism about liquids into his proof that water must be H2O [Salmon,N on Putnam]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
15142 Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
7705 The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
4099 If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane]
12026 We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam]
3208 Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
3893 Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Putnam, by Scruton]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
11191 The hidden structure of a natural kind determines membership in all possible worlds [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
11192 If causes are the essence of diseases, then disease is an example of a relational essence [Putnam, by Williams,NE]
11190 Archimedes meant by 'gold' the hidden structure or essence of the stuff [Putnam]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
15133 A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson]