9 ideas
18487 | We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge] |
13591 | Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine] |
9138 | An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference [Yablo, by Sorensen] |
18488 | We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge] |
13590 | Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine] |
8483 | Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine] |
13589 | Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine] |
13588 | A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine] |
13592 | Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine] |