47 ideas
| 11147 | Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 21544 | It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell] |
| 12204 | The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt] |
| 12195 | Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt] |
| 12199 | There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt] |
| 12201 | We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt] |
| 21539 | Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell] |
| 12194 | Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt] |
| 12198 | Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt] |
| 21538 | If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell] |
| 21534 | The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell] |
| 21540 | Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell] |
| 21536 | When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell] |
| 21535 | Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell] |
| 14532 | A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| 12200 | A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt] |
| 12193 | Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt] |
| 12202 | Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt] |
| 21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
| 12203 | If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt] |
| 21537 | I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell] |
| 11141 | Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 21532 | Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell] |
| 11142 | Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 21542 | Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell] |
| 11121 | Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 21541 | The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell] |
| 11120 | Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11123 | Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11125 | The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11128 | Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11130 | Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11129 | The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11131 | It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11132 | The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11133 | Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11134 | People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11135 | Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11136 | Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11138 | The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11137 | The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11139 | Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11146 | People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 21543 | If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell] |