Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts', 'Constructibility and Mathematical Existence' and 'Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

10 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
8758 We could talk of open sentences, instead of sets [Chihara, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
9390 Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
10265 Chihara's system is a variant of type theory, from which he can translate sentences [Chihara, by Shapiro]
8759 We can replace type theory with open sentences and a constructibility quantifier [Chihara, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
10264 Introduce a constructibility quantifiers (Cx)Φ - 'it is possible to construct an x such that Φ' [Chihara, by Shapiro]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9389 Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]