13 ideas
18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
3986 | The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware [Dennett] |
3987 | Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence [Dennett] |
3984 | The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role [Dennett] |
18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
3983 | Learning is evolution in the brain [Dennett] |
18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |
3985 | Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature [Dennett] |