11 ideas
| 7661 | Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce] |
| 9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
| 14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
| 14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
| 9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
| 14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
| 19089 | Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce] |
| 7660 | We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce] |
| 14906 | Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce] |
| 14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
| 14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |