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All the ideas for 'The Boundary Stones of Thought', 'Mathematics is Megethology' and 'Elements of the Philosophy of Right'

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101 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom emerges at the end of a process [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is exploration of the rational [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Logic doesn't have a metaphysical basis, but nor can logic give rise to the metaphysics [Rumfitt]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Subjective and objective are not firmly opposed, but merge into one another [Hegel]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
The idea that there are unrecognised truths is basic to our concept of truth [Rumfitt]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
'True at a possibility' means necessarily true if what is said had obtained [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Semantics for propositions: 1) validity preserves truth 2) non-contradition 3) bivalence 4) truth tables [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
'Absolute necessity' would have to rest on S5 [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
It is the second-order part of intuitionistic logic which actually negates some classical theorems [Rumfitt]
Intuitionists can accept Double Negation Elimination for decidable propositions [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Mathematics reduces to set theory, which reduces, with some mereology, to the singleton function [Lewis]
Most set theorists doubt bivalence for the Continuum Hypothesis, but still use classical logic [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
We can accept the null set, but not a null class, a class lacking members [Lewis]
The null set plays the role of last resort, for class abstracts and for existence [Lewis]
The null set is not a little speck of sheer nothingness, a black hole in Reality [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
What on earth is the relationship between a singleton and an element? [Lewis]
Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates? [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
The iterated conception of set requires continual increase in axiom strength [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
A set may well not consist of its members; the empty set, for example, is a problem [Rumfitt]
A set can be determinate, because of its concept, and still have vague membership [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / g. Axiom of Powers VI
If the totality of sets is not well-defined, there must be doubt about the Power Set Axiom [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification to mereology [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic is higher-order laws which can expand the range of any sort of deduction [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
The case for classical logic rests on its rules, much more than on the Principle of Bivalence [Rumfitt]
Classical logic rules cannot be proved, but various lines of attack can be repelled [Rumfitt]
If truth-tables specify the connectives, classical logic must rely on Bivalence [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Logical consequence is a relation that can extended into further statements [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
Normal deduction presupposes the Cut Law [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
When faced with vague statements, Bivalence is not a compelling principle [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
In specifying a logical constant, use of that constant is quite unavoidable [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
We can use mereology to simulate quantification over relations [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Introduction rules give deduction conditions, and Elimination says what can be deduced [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truths are just the assumption-free by-products of logical rules [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
Monotonicity means there is a guarantee, rather than mere inductive support [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Maybe an ordinal is a property of isomorphic well-ordered sets, and not itself a set [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
Infinitesimals do not stand in a determinate order relation to zero [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Cantor and Dedekind aimed to give analysis a foundation in set theory (rather than geometry) [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Mathematics is generalisations about singleton functions [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions [Lewis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
Personality overcomes subjective limitations and posits Dasein as its own [Hegel]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
An object that is not clearly red or orange can still be red-or-orange, which sweeps up problem cases [Rumfitt]
The extension of a colour is decided by a concept's place in a network of contraries [Rumfitt]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion [Lewis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical modalities respect the actual identities of things [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
S5 is the logic of logical necessity [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Since possibilities are properties of the world, calling 'red' the determination of a determinable seems right [Rumfitt]
If two possibilities can't share a determiner, they are incompatible [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possibilities are like possible worlds, but not fully determinate or complete [Rumfitt]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Medieval logicians said understanding A also involved understanding not-A [Rumfitt]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
In English 'evidence' is a mass term, qualified by 'little' and 'more' [Rumfitt]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
It is a rejection of intellectual dignity to say that we cannot know the truth [Hegel]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
A person is a being which is aware of its own self-directed and free subjectivity [Hegel]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
A human only become a somebody as a member of a social estate [Hegel]
Individuals attain their right by discovering their self-consciousness in institutions [Hegel]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
A free will primarily wills its own freedoom [Hegel, by Houlgate]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
We understand conditionals, but disagree over their truth-conditions [Rumfitt]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
The truth grounds for 'not A' are the possibilities incompatible with truth grounds for A [Rumfitt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The concept of the will is the free will which wills its freedom [Hegel]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Evil enters a good will when we believe we are doing right, but allow no criticism of our choice [Hegel, by Houlgate]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Conscience is the right of the self to know what is right and obligatory, and thus make them true [Hegel]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is ethical life in its natural form [Hegel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
You can't have a morality which is supplied by the individual, but is also genuinely universal [Hegel, by MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
Be a person, and respect other persons [Hegel]
The categorical imperative lacks roots in a historical culture [Hegel, by Bowie]
The categorical imperative is fine if you already have a set of moral principles [Hegel]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
The good is realised freedom [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The family is the first basis of the state, but estates are a necessary second [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
We cannot assert rights which are unnatural [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
I aim to portray the state as a rational entity [Hegel]
Society draws people, and requires their work, making them wholly dependent on it [Hegel]
The state is the march of God in the world [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Individuals can't leave the state, because they are natural citizens, and humans require a state [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
A fully developed state is conscious and knows what it wills [Hegel]
The people do not have the ability to know the general will [Hegel]
The great man of the ages is the one who reveals and accomplishes the will of his time [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
A constitution embodies a nation's rights and condition [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Individuals must dedicate themselves to the ethical whole, and give their lives when asked [Hegel]
Social groups must focus on the state, which must in turn respect their inclusion and their will [Hegel]
People can achieve respect for their state by insight into its essence [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
In the 1840s Hegel seemed to defend society being right as it is, as a manifestation of Mind [Hegel, by Singer]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
Majority rule means obligations can be imposed on me [Hegel]
The state should reflect all interests, and not just popular will, or a popular party [Hegel, by Houlgate]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
In modern states an individual's actions should be their choice [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Moral individuals become ethical when they see the social aspect of a matter [Hegel, by Houlgate]
For Hegel, the moral life can only be led within a certain type of community [Hegel, by MacIntyre]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Even educated women are unsuited to science, philosophy, art and government [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slaves have no duties because they have no rights [Hegel]
Slaves are partly responsible for their own condition [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
True liberal freedom is to pursue something, while being free to cease the pursuit [Hegel, by Houlgate]
People assume they are free, but the options available are not under their control [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
Freedom requires us to submit to a family, or a corporation, or a state [Hegel, by Houlgate]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Money is the best way to achieve just equality [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Rights imply duties, and duties imply rights [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Man has an absolute right to appropriate things [Hegel]
Because only human beings can own property, everything else can become our property [Hegel]
A community does not have the property-owning rights that a person has [Hegel]
The owner of a thing is obviously the first person to freely take possession of it [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
Wars add strength to a nation, and cure internal dissension [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Children need discipline, to break their self-will and eradicate sensuousness [Hegel]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
To have pagan beliefs and be a pagan are quite different [Hegel]
Some religions lead to harsh servitude and the debasement of human beings [Hegel]