19 ideas
11103 | We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine] |
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
11092 | A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine] |
11093 | We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
11101 | General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine] |
11096 | Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine] |
11099 | Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine] |
11094 | 'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop [Quine] |
11097 | Red is the largest red thing in the universe [Quine] |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
17595 | To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine] |
11095 | We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine] |
11104 | Concepts are language [Quine] |
11102 | Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms [Quine] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |