13 ideas
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
3296 | Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel] |
3295 | Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel] |
3293 | If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel] |
3292 | The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel] |
2850 | How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink] |
2848 | Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink] |
2853 | Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink] |
2852 | Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink] |
2849 | Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink] |
2851 | Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink] |
3294 | As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel] |