21 ideas
8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |