7 ideas
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
21907 | We don't want another new set of categories; we want a variety of flexible categories [Deleuze, by May] |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
12205 | There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington] |
12207 | Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington] |
12206 | Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington] |
12208 | An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington] |