Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts', 'Propositions' and 'On the Philosophy of Logic'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

17 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason

8952	We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic

8943	Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher]

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic

8945	Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

9390	Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic

8951	Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic

8950	Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive

9455	Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer]

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions

9454	The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness

8946	We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher]

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

8944	Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]

9389	Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility

8941	We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals

8947	If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals

8949	In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]

19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions

9453	Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer]

9452	Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer]

19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense

9451	Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer]